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I. INTRODUCTION 
Why do so-called consumer protection laws provide so little 
actual protection? 
In this article, we will first examine the current state of most 
consumer protection legislation, exploring some reasons why the 
laws have developed in this manner, and considering why 
disclosures alone often do not – and cannot – provide meaningful 
protection for consumers who most need it.  We will then discuss 
Minnesota Statutes Chapter 325N, a progressive law enacted in 
2004 that substantively regulates foreclosure reconveyances, a 
transaction often abused in a scam commonly known as “equity 
stripping.”  Finally, using Chapter 325N as a model, we will 
consider other Minnesota consumer protection laws that could be 
strengthened by the addition of similar substantive protections. 
We hope that this article will cause readers to think about 
                                                          
       †   Kristin Siegesmund is the supervising attorney of the Legal Aid Society of 
Minneapolis consumer unit.  She is a graduate of the University of Michigan Law 
School and Brown University. 
      ††    Leah Weaver is an Equal Justice Works Fellow at the Legal Aid Society of 
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those consumers most deserving and needing of protection from 
scams, how our free market “caveat emptor” philosophy is failing 
those consumers, and how we can provide stronger protections 
while making the market a safer and fairer place for all consumers. 
II. CONSUMER PROTECTION: CAVEAT EMPTOR 
Governments have recognized the need to protect consumers 
from abusive practices since before the time of Shakespeare.1  
Usury laws prohibiting unfairly high interest rates are perhaps the 
oldest consumer protection laws, dating back to medieval times.2  
The heyday of consumer protection was in the 1960s and 1970s 
when legislators passed numerous consumer protection laws at 
both the state and federal levels.3  Minnesota currently has over 
seventy-five consumer protection laws on its books,4 including a 
usury law prohibiting interest above 8% on certain loans.5  Yet 
despite all these protections, predatory practices abound.6  With so 
much legislation, why are consumers still so vulnerable? 
Very few consumer protection laws actually prohibit abusive 
contract terms or exorbitant prices.  Rather, the majority of these 
laws simply mandate disclosures.  For instance, Congress enacted 
the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA)7 “to assure a meaningful 
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to 
compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and 
avoid the uninformed use of credit . . . .”8  To that end, TILA 
                                                          
 1. See Elaine S. Tan, An Empty Shell? Rethinking the Usury Laws in Medieval 
Europe, 23 J. LEGAL HIST. 177, 177 (2003).  For a Shakespearean view of money 
lenders, see WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3. 
 2. See Tan, supra note 1, at 177. 
 3. See, e.g., Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 1, 76 Stat. 780 
(1962) (enacting sections 358–60, amending sections 321, 331, 332, 348, 351–53, 
355, 357, 372, 374, 376, and 381, and enacting provisions set out as notes under 
sections 321, 331, 332, 352, 355, 360, and 374); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
3601–19 (2000) (effective Apr. 11, 1968); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1691 (2000) (effective Oct. 28, 1974). 
 4. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ch. 325F (2004), ch. 70A (2004), §§ 47.59–.60 
(2004), 144A.4605 (2004), 155A.01 (2004), 184.33 (2004), 216B.098 (2004), 
325G.17–.20 (2004), 325G.23–.28 (2004), 336A.02–.14 (2004), 386.375 (2004). 
 5. MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (2004). 
 6. See, e.g., STEVE TRIPOLI & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
DREAMS FORECLOSED: THE RAMPANT THEFT OF AMERICANS’ HOMES THROUGH EQUITY-
STRIPPING FORECLOSURE “RESCUE” SCAMS (June 2005), http://www.consumerlaw. 
org/news/ForeclosureReportFinal.pdf. 
 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67 (2000). 
 8. Id. § 1601(a). 
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requires lenders to make certain disclosures depending on the type 
of credit extended, such as the annual percentage rate (APR),9 the 
right to rescind,10 or the finance charge amount.11  The Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)12 amends TILA 
and provides additional protection for certain high-cost home 
mortgage loans.  While HOEPA prohibits a few especially abusive 
terms,13 its primary effect is to require additional disclosures.14 
Most state consumer protection laws operate in a similar way.  
They limit very few practices and rely primarily on disclosure of 
essential terms.  For instance, although lenders making short-term 
unsecured loans under $350 are limited in their charges, the 
permitted charges are astronomical when expressed as APRs.15  
Although the lenders must post notices informing borrowers that 
they will pay high charges, nothing requires them to disclose these 
charges as an APR.16  There is no limit on the amount a hotel may 
charge its guests to make a local call, but the hotel must post a 
notice “on or near each telephone” that states the amount of the 
charge.17  While there are a few exceptions,18 consumer protection 
laws typically boil down to caveat emptor – let the buyer beware. 
Federal preemption of the area has stymied attempts by states, 
including Minnesota, to impose more safeguards.  States may not 
pass laws that interfere with or weaken a federal regulatory scheme.  
At one time, the preemption doctrine was interpreted as a floor.  
States could add to, but could not take away from, protections that 
federal regulations provided.  But more recently, especially with the 
rise of national banking, commercial interests have successfully 
argued that it is too burdensome to comply with fifty different state 
laws.  States may attempt to regulate consumer areas, but if the 
federal government steps in, typically much weaker regulations will 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., id. § 1637(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 10. Id. § 1635(a).  
 11. See, e.g, id. § 1638(a)(3). 
 12. Id. §§ 1602(aa), 1610, 1639–40. 
 13. See id. §§ 1639(c), (e)–(h) (prohibiting prepayment penalties, balloon 
payments within five years of origination, negative amortization, prepaid 
payments, and extending credit without regard for the consumer’s ability to pay). 
 14. Id. §§ 1639(a), (b). 
 15. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60(2) (2004).  For example, a one-month loan of $50 
may have a charge of $5.50 added to it, which equals an APR of 132%.  Id. at 
subdiv. (2)(a)(1). 
 16. Id. at subdiv. 4(e). 
 17. MINN. STAT. § 325F.99 (2004). 
 18. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 325F.91 subdiv. 3 (2004) (limiting late fees in rent-
to-own agreements). 
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preempt state legislation.  Minnesota has attempted to protect 
borrowers against usurious interest rates, but it can only do so for 
loans not made by banks or other federally regulated lenders.19  
Minnesota formerly prohibited prepayment penalties on mortgage 
loans but now generally allows them within certain parameters and 
with certain disclosures.20  Because most consumer legislation 
touches on areas of interstate commerce, federal preemption of 
state laws presents a huge bar to substantive regulation of 
consumer transactions. 
The primary reasons why consumer protection legislation 
relies so heavily on disclosures instead of making substantive limits 
are the American faith in the free market and Americans’ equal 
distrust of big government regulation and paternalism.  When 
consumers are well informed, they supposedly have equal 
bargaining power with other market participants, such as lenders 
or merchants.  The consumers can shop around, compare prices or 
interest rates, and make the best decision, choosing to do business 
with one merchant and not another.  This comparison shopping 
will influence lenders to compete for the consumers’ business by 
offering lower rates and reduced fees and will entice merchants to 
lower their prices.  The market will fairly allocate risks and rewards.  
Further, consumers are free to make choices.  Unfortunately, 
various factors can interfere with the free market’s regulatory 
influence. 
Those who see the market as an effective regulatory tool 
assume that parties on both sides of the transaction – seller and 
purchaser, or lender and borrower – make rational decisions.  A 
seller will not ask for more than a purchaser can afford, and a 
lender will not loan more than a borrower can repay.  But when the 
impetus to make a rational decision is removed from one side of 
the equation, that regulatory effect is removed.  This may seem 
farfetched, but it is exactly what has happened in mortgage lending 
due to the influence of the secondary mortgage market. 
Historically, the institution originating a mortgage loan 
serviced it until the borrower paid off the loan.  This meant that 
the lenders had real incentive to underwrite their loans properly 
and to ensure that borrowers could meet their obligations – if 
                                                          
 19. See MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (2004) (“No person shall directly or indirectly 
take or receive in money, goods, or things in action, or in any other way, any 
greater sum, or any greater value, for the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or 
things in action, than $8 on $100 for one year.”). 
 20. MINN. STAT. § 58.137 subdiv. 2 (2004). 
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borrowers’ monthly payments were too high, they would default, 
and the lender would be forced to foreclose on the property 
securing the loan to recover any of its funds, an expensive 
proposition.  In the past twenty years, the emerging secondary 
mortgage market has removed much of that incentive.  Few 
mortgage originators still service loans.  Now, the originating 
lender quickly sells the loans on the secondary mortgage market, 
often to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).  
Then, Fannie Mae pools and packages these loans into mortgage-
backed securities.21  Finally, investors buy these securities, and 
Fannie Mae uses the income from the sale of the securities to 
purchase more loans from originators.22 
In theory, the resale of the loans benefits borrowers.  Because 
this practice quickly replenishes the lenders’ funds, especially in 
rapidly growing areas, they are able to make more loans without 
waiting thirty years for mortgagors to repay the funds; this should 
keep costs and interest rates low, which will encourage borrowing.23  
However, the securitization of mortgages on the secondary 
mortgage market has had a negative side effect.  Instead of making 
realistic predictions about a borrower’s ability to repay the loan, the 
originator now encourages the borrower to take out the largest 
amount for which it has approved him.  The originator will be 
repaid almost immediately when the loan has been packaged and 
sold to Fannie Mae or another agency that issues mortgage-backed 
securities.  Instead of considering the borrower’s long-term ability 
to repay the loan, the originator now hopes only to make as much 
money as possible in the short-term.  Any incentive to make a 
realistic loan – as opposed to pushing the consumer to borrow as 
much money as she possibly can – has been removed by the 
planned resale of the loan on the secondary mortgage market.  Put 
another way, a profitable and therefore commercially reasonable 
loan for a mortgage originator can now include a loan anticipated 
to fail from the beginning.  Thus, the effect of risk for the lender 
has lost any meaningful regulatory impact.  To avoid abuses and 
                                                          
 21. JEAN CUMMINGS & DENISE DIPASQUALE, CITY RESEARCH, A PRIMER ON THE 
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 5 (June 4, 1997), http://www.cityresearch.com/ 
pres/smm.pdf.  The process of pooling mortgages and packaging them into 
mortgage backed securities is called “securitization.”  See U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (Feb. 11, 2003), http:// 
www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm. 
 22. CUMMINGS & DIPASQUALE, supra note 21, at 5. 
 23. Id. at 4, 8. 
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unreasonable loans, the borrower must rely heavily on disclosures 
when deciding whether to accept or reject offered terms.  However, 
these disclosures do not work. 
For disclosures to be meaningful, the consumer must be able 
to read, understand, and appreciate the information disclosed.  A 
real problem occurs when individuals receiving the disclosures do 
not understand them.  This can happen for a number of reasons – 
for example, everyone is familiar with the credit card disclosures 
printed in a font size almost too small to be legible.  And 
disclosures are often written in complicated legalese.  For instance, 
many individuals do not understand the difference between a 
simple interest rate and an APR.24  Other disclosures are vague or 
not written in a way that is meaningful.  Although Minnesota 
payday lenders must post notices informing borrowers that they will 
pay high charges, the law does not require that these charges be 
disclosed as interest or as an APR.25  While tiny fonts and terms of 
art can ruin a disclosure’s effectiveness, they are not the only 
problem. 
A consumer’s poor English language or reading skills can also 
render disclosures meaningless and prevent him from 
understanding the warning.  Few consumer protection laws require 
disclosures in languages other than English, even if the parties 
conduct the transaction in another language.  Some statutes 
intending to provide clearly written, easily understood disclosures 
mandate the content of the disclosure, along with font size and 
prominent display.  However, mandating the content could reduce 
its effectiveness for non-English speakers by prohibiting language 
access.  For instance, some lenders solicit loans by mailing live 
checks to individuals; endorsing and cashing the checks constitutes 
acceptance of the loan terms.  Minnesota Statutes Section 47.605 
                                                          
 24. “Interest rate” typically refers to simple interest, computed on the original 
face amount of the loan.  A $100 loan with a 5% interest rate would result in $5 of 
interest charges in the specified time period.  APR is intended to express the true 
cost of credit, and includes finance charges and fees as well as interest charges.  12 
C.F.R. § 226.22(a)(1) (2006).  One way to calculate APR is the Newton-Raphson 
method.  Loan amount = C, extra costs = E, interest rate = r, months of the loan = 
N.  First, figure the monthly loan payment (P) as follows: P = [(C+E)r(1+r)N]/ 
[(1+r)N – 1].  Then using that figure, solve for APR A (a = A/1200) as follows: 
[a(1+a)N /(1+a)N – 1] – P/C = 0.  Got it?  Different formulas apply depending on 
whether the credit is open-end (as in a revolving line of credit) or closed-end (as 
in a mortgage loan), and can be found in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. section 226 
appendices F, J (2006). 
 25. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60 subdiv. 4(e) (2004). 
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regulates these loan solicitations, mandating certain disclosures 
with the intent of helping consumers understand the effect of 
cashing the check.  But a translated notice advising “ESTA ES UNA 
SOLICITUD PARA UN PRÉSTAMO – LEA LAS SIGUIENTES 
CLÁUSULAS ADJUNTAS ANTES DE FIRMAR Y CAMBIAR ESTE 
CHEQUE” would likely better serve Spanish speakers, responding 
to a letter written in Spanish, than would the English statement 
“THIS IS A SOLICITATION FOR A LOAN – READ THE 
ENCLOSED DISCLOSURES BEFORE SIGNING AND CASHING 
THIS CHECK” that the current law requires.26 
The market’s regulatory influence depends on well-informed 
consumers who shop around in order to make the best choice 
possible.  Consumers may enter into less than optimal agreements 
because they do not know that they have other options or because 
meaningful options are not available to them. 
The Center for Responsible Lending recently released a study 
analyzing the effect of race and ethnicity on home mortgage loan 
rates.  This study, using data that lenders released under the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act,27 showed that African-American 
borrowers are significantly more likely to receive a high-rate, sub-
prime home mortgage loan than white borrowers, even controlling 
for credit scores and other factors legitimately affecting interest 
rates.28  Similarly, the study found that Latino borrowers were also 
far more likely to receive higher interest rates than white borrowers 
– in the case of fixed-rate purchase loans without prepayment 
penalties, 142% more likely.29  The free market is not working for 
these borrowers to provide the best loans possible because 
discriminatory underwriting and pricing practices have intervened. 
Similarly, the free market disserves the borrower who does not 
have the time or collateral to avail herself of conventional lending.  
Small, short-term, unsecured loans, often called “payday” loans, are 
subject to only minimal regulation and disclosure requirements,30 
but these disclosures often do not matter.  Consumers entering 
into these transactions must be aware that the interest rates are 
high, but these are not loans for those with good credit and 
                                                          
 26. See MINN. STAT. § 47.605 subdiv. 3(b) (2004). 
 27. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–10 (2000). 
 28. DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE 
AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 16 (May 31, 2006), available 
at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr011-Unfair_Lending-0506.pdf. 
 29. Id. at 18. 
 30. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60 (2004). 
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collateral.  Individuals teetering on the edge of financial crisis, who 
need the money to pay the rent or buy food, are often the ones 
who obtain these loans.  With few, if any, real options available, 
disclosures do not make a difference.  If a person has no collateral 
and faces a choice between taking out a payday loan at an APR over 
100% or being evicted for nonpayment of rent, the loan will be the 
clear choice.  Although these loans typically have small principal 
amounts, their effect on an individual’s or family’s finances can be 
huge.  Consumers in tight financial circumstances often cannot 
afford to pay the loan off in just two weeks and will either roll the 
loan over or pay off the loan with another; one study found that the 
average payday loan borrower has eleven loans per year.31  A 
Minnesota borrower would pay $23 in fees for a $300 payday loan.32  
Rolled over eleven times, the fees would total $253, and the 
borrower would still owe the original $300.  The Center for 
Responsible Lending estimated in 2003 that predatory payday 
lending costs consumers $3.4 billion annually.33  Given that the 
payday lending industry more than doubled between the years 2000 
and 2003 and has shown no signs of slowing its growth,34 it stands to 
reason that 2006 borrowers will pay far more than $3.4 billion to 
payday lenders. 
Disclosures are not enough.  Legal terms are too abstruse even 
for most literate Americans.  The risk/reward system that would 
regulate some lender behavior has become unhinged, providing 
reward for commercially unreasonable loans with virtually no risk 
to the lender.  And the free market premise that consumers have 
full knowledge and free choice is seriously flawed because of 
economic realities and discrimination.  Vulnerable consumers need 
more protection to give them equal footing with merchants and 
lenders in the marketplace. 
III.  MINNESOTA STATUTES CHAPTER 325N 
Minnesota Statutes Chapter 325N is unusual in that few other 
states regulate the transactions that the codes define as “foreclosure 
                                                          
 31. KEITH ERNST ET AL., QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY 
PAYDAY LENDING 3–4, 8 (Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www.responsiblelending 
.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf. 
 32. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60 subdiv. 2(4) (2004). 
 33. ERNST, supra note 31, at 7–8. 
 34. Id. at 2. 
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reconveyances.”35  And it is also unusual, however, when compared 
to other consumer protection laws in that it actually provides 
substantive protections – limiting consumers’ losses and capping 
purchasers’ profits from these transactions. 
Prior to the Minnesota State Legislature’s enacting Chapter 
325N, the foreclosure reconveyances were unregulated and easily 
abused.  Although they can take several forms, there is a basic 
pattern that most of these transactions follow. 
First, a homeowner with a significant amount of equity in the 
home misses one or more mortgage payments, and the lender 
begins the foreclosure process.  One of the first steps of this process 
is publication of a notice of the lender’s intent to foreclose.36  This 
notice, which the lender must publish for at least six weeks, must 
include the mortgagor’s name, the address of the mortgaged 
property, the original principal amount, the date of the loan, and 
the amount that the lender claims is due.37  When an investor cross-
references these publications against public property records listing 
such things as other recorded liens or judgments and county-
assessed market value, it is easy to determine which homeowners 
facing foreclosure have substantial equity in their homes. 
Once the investor has found homeowners with significant 
equity remaining, the investor will approach them offering various 
types of assistance.  Offers of help may range from a quick purchase 
of the home for cash to refinancing the homeowner’s mortgage.  If 
the homeowner wants to try to keep the home, as is often the case, 
the investor may enter into a reconveyance with the homeowner.  
The homeowner temporarily sells the home to the investor, 
allegedly for the purpose of securing financing to pay off the 
foreclosing lender.  The investor allows the homeowner to stay in 
the property and buy it back at a price that covers the loan, the 
investor’s fees, and other costs. 
As an example, assume a homeowner purchased her home ten 
                                                          
 35. California (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1695–1695.17, 2945–2945.11), Georgia (GA. 
CODE ANN. § 10-1-393 subdiv. (b)(20)(A)), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. 
§ 7-301-321), and Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.935–.943) are the other states 
that regulate some aspect of foreclosure reconveyance transactions.  Maryland’s 
law is the most similar to Minnesota’s Chapter 325N. 
 36. See MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (2004) (requiring that “[s]ix weeks published 
notice shall be given that such mortgage will be foreclosed by sale of the 
mortgaged premises, or some part thereof, and at least four weeks before the 
appointed time of the sale a copy of such notice shall be served upon the person 
in possession of the mortgaged premises, if the same are actually occupied.”). 
 37. Id. §§ 580.03–.04 (2004).  
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years ago and owes $70,000 on her mortgage.  Her home has 
appreciated over time, and it is now worth $200,000, giving her 
$130,000 in home equity.  The homeowner loses her job and falls 
behind on her $600 monthly mortgage payment as she searches for 
new employment.  If she sold the home for a fair price, she could 
expect to walk away from the closing with over $100,000 after 
realtor fees and closing costs.  But she may not want to move, or 
she may not be able to find suitable housing that is less expensive 
than the mortgage payment she could not meet.  These situations 
lead homeowners to enter into foreclosure reconveyances. 
In a straightforward foreclosure reconveyance transaction, the 
investor first purchases the home, paying off the foreclosed loan 
and any other liens.  The purchase price may be set slightly higher 
than the total amount owed on the home to cover closing costs and 
to allow the homeowner to receive some cash at the closing.  Then, 
typically in the same transaction, the investor conveys an interest in 
the home back to the homeowner, often either with a contract for 
deed or a lease with a purchase option.  If done fairly, this 
arrangement allows the homeowner to make affordable payments 
to the investor and repurchase the home after a set amount of 
time, with the investor receiving a higher price than she paid for 
the home as a return on her investment.  In our hypothetical, the 
homeowner could sell her home to the investor for $80,000.  This 
would pay off her foreclosed loan, cover closing costs, and even 
give her some cash from the transaction.  The homeowner would 
continue to live in the home, making payments for a year or two to 
the investor, while she finds new employment and cleans up her 
credit.  Then, at the end of the predetermined time period, she 
could repurchase the home from the investor for $100,000.  This 
would allow the investor almost $20,000 profit after closing costs. 
In a typical equity skimming transaction, the unscrupulous 
investor sets the purchase price as high as possible and then obtains 
a mortgage for nearly the full value of the home.  The homeowner 
receives no proceeds, which instead go to the investor to pay the 
investor’s fees and to pay costs in the future.  The investor also sets 
the lease or contract payments much higher than the homeowner 
can afford.  When this happens, the homeowner will inevitably 
default on the payments.  The investor can then evict the 
homeowner in a summary housing court proceeding and resell the 
home for fair market value – pocketing the homeowner’s equity 
and leaving the homeowner with nothing. 
10
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In our hypothetical, imagine an unscrupulous investor who, 
instead of purchasing the property for $80,000, purchases it for 
$200,000 and places a $160,000 mortgage on the property.  The 
homeowner sees no proceeds from this sale, which allegedly should 
net the homeowner $130,000.  Why not?  The investor uses the 
proceeds of the $160,000 to pay off the $70,000 loan in foreclosure 
and inflated closing costs of $30,000.  The investor is paid a fee of 
$36,000.  The investor puts the remaining money into an “escrow 
account,” where questionable costs and management fees quickly 
drain the balance.  Imagine if our hypothetical investor then 
required monthly payments hundreds of dollars more than those 
on the foreclosed loan.  What options would be available to the 
homeowner?  How could she possibly hope to complete the 
reconveyance and regain full title to her home? 
This clear potential for abuse led to the Legislature’s 
regulation of foreclosure reconveyances.  In addition to its typical 
consumer protection provisions, such as requiring written 
contracts38 and a five-day right to cancel,39 and even strengthening 
its disclosures by requiring language access,40 Chapter 325N also 
sets substantive limits on several terms of the reconveyance 
transaction.  First, before entering into the transaction, the 
purchaser must verify the homeowner’s ability to complete the 
reconveyance – both by making the monthly lease or contract 
payments and by making the final re-purchase.41  The statute 
creates the presumption of affordability if the monthly payments, 
along with other listed housing expenses, do not exceed 60% of the 
homeowner’s monthly gross income.42  If the homeowner is unable 
to complete the reconveyance despite these provisions, the statute 
requires that the investor pay the homeowner 82% of the fair 
market value of the home, minus expenses, within 150 days of the 
homeowner’s eviction or voluntary move-out.43  In addition to 
limiting the investor’s fee to 18% of the fair market value, this 
                                                          
 38. MINN. STAT. §§ 325N.03, .11 (2004). 
 39. MINN. STAT. §§ 325N.02, .13 (2004). 
 40. MINN. STAT. §§ 325N.03(c), .11 (2004). 
 41. MINN. STAT. § 325N.17(a)(1) (2004). 
 42. Id.  Housing expenses in the 60% calculation include “payments for 
regular principal, interest, rent, utilities, hazard insurance, real estate taxes, and 
association dues.”  Id. 
 43. MINN. STAT. § 325N.17(b)(2) (2004).  For accounting forms showing how 
to calculate the payment to the homeowner and what expenses she may deduct 
from that 82% figure, see http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/housing/ 
HomeOwnerPaymentAccountingForms.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
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provision also ensures that homeowners do not lose the entire 
value of the equity that they worked to build prior to foreclosure. 
Compliance with Chapter 325N would dramatically change the 
outcome of our second hypothetical above.  The investor would be 
required to verify the homeowner’s income before entering into an 
agreement with her.  A contract, written in the same language used 
by the parties when negotiating the deal, would memorialize the 
terms of their agreement, and the homeowner would have five 
business days after signing the contract to change her mind.  If she 
were unable to complete the reconveyance, she would receive 82% 
of fair market value, $164,000, less reasonable costs such as 
satisfying her mortgage and paying closing costs.  She would take 
away at least $64,000 in equity, and the investor would still receive 
her fee of 18% of fair market value, $36,000.  Both parties benefit 
from the transaction, instead of one party – the original 
homeowner – receiving practically nothing. 
Foreclosures and foreclosure reconveyance transactions are 
not unique to Minnesota, but Chapter 325N is an unusual law that 
passed under unusual circumstances.  Since 1980, the prevalent 
mood favoring deregulation and reliance on market forces has 
thwarted new consumer protection legislation.  But events in 2004 
converged to allow the passage of this new law. 
The Minnesota State Legislature passed Chapter 325N amid 
great publicity about the problem of equity stripping.44  Much of 
this publicity was due to the actions of Attorney General Mike 
Hatch, who filed suit against three of the state’s largest equity 
stripping scammers.45  The Attorney General’s suit against one of 
the companies, HJE Financial, LLC, helped provide the political 
pressure necessary for the bill’s passage through the Legislature.  
Moreover, one of the company’s principals, Ron Esau, had served 
as Governor Tim Pawlenty’s campaign treasurer.46  This created a 
unique political climate with pressure for both parties to support 
tougher laws. 
                                                          
 44. See, e.g., Sheila Mulrooney Eldred, Stripped Clean, CITY PAGES (Minneapolis-
St. Paul), July 21, 2004, at 11; Neal Gendler, Lender’s License Suspended, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), May 21, 2004, at 1D; Nolan Zavoral, Rally Targets St. Paul Real Estate 
Firm, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 15, 2003, at 5B. 
 45. State v. Grant Holding, LLC, No. C6-03-12006 (Ramsey County (MN) D. 
Ct. filed 2003); State v. HJE Fin., LLC, No. 03-CV-5554-JNE/JSM (D. Minn. filed 
Oct. 2003); State v. Home Funding Corp., No. C4-03-7691 (Dakota County (MN) 
D. Ct. filed Apr. 28, 2003). 
 46. Pat Doyle, State Fines Pawlenty Campaign Treasurer, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Sept. 24, 2005, at 7B. 
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At this point in time, it is impossible to tell what the long-term 
effects of Chapter 325N’s substantive provisions will be.  As of this 
writing, the statute has been in effect less than two years.  No 
published case law on Chapter 325N exists, and few cases are 
proceeding.  The only case dealing with Chapter 325N that has 
come before the Minnesota Court of Appeals presented the 
question of housing court jurisdiction over evictions with Chapter 
325N counter-claims and defenses.47  No analysis or commentary 
has been published addressing whether the statute’s substantive 
restrictions would unreasonably chill the private investor market. 
There is strong reason to believe that the substantive terms 
and limits in Chapter 325N will have a positive effect for all parties 
involved in the transaction.  The statute recognizes that this type of 
financing arrangement is riskier than conventional loans.  While 
not dictating terms or banning significant financial rewards to 
investors, the statute provides reasonable limits to curtail predatory 
practices.  Because the statute limits a foreclosed homeowner’s 
monthly payment to 60% of monthly gross income, individuals 
entering in to these transactions truly stand a chance of 
repurchasing their homes.48  If the reconveyance fails and the 
foreclosed homeowner moves out, or if the investor evicts her from 
the home, both parties still benefit.  Homeowners with significant 
equity will not lose everything.  Investors’ and brokers’ profits are 
limited, but at 18% of fair market value, profits can be substantial 
while still complying with the statute.49  If the parties later disagree 
about the fairness of the transaction, the statute removes discretion 
from the court and instead imposes clear guidelines to assist the 
court in deciding whether the terms are reasonable.  Chapter 325N 
provides a model for a statute that offers objective guidelines to 
curb abuses while still allowing significant room for investors and 
homeowners to negotiate the terms and benefits of the transaction. 
IV.  CONSUMERS WOULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIVE 
PROTECTIONS 
The substantive limits in Chapter 325N clearly benefit 
foreclosed homeowners, foreclosure purchasers, and foreclosure 
                                                          
 47. Real Estate Equity Strategies, LLC v. Jones, 720 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
 48. MINN. STAT. § 325N.17(a)(1) (2004). 
 49. See MINN. STAT. § 325N.17(b)(2) (2004).  See also hypothetical supra Part 
III. 
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consultants.  If legislators used this chapter as a model, they could 
make any number of other consumer protection laws stronger by 
the addition of similar substantive limits. 
A.  Fees for Late Rent: Define and Limit “Reasonable.” 
One area that could benefit from more objective guidelines 
and limits is late fees in residential leases.  Minnesota Statutes 
Chapter 504B governs landlord-tenant relationships.  This chapter 
addresses various rights and responsibilities, including mutual 
covenants against allowing unlawful activity,50 a tenant’s right to 
privacy,51 and shared utility meters.52  However, nowhere does the 
chapter discuss the issue of fees for late payment of rent.  Over the 
years, Minnesota courts have determined that late fees are 
permissible when they take the form of reasonable liquidated 
damages, and not a penalty.53  The fees must be reasonable and not 
disproportionate to actual damages.54  Unfortunately, the failure to 
provide objective guidance has led to abuse. 
Many leases have late fee policies that, on their face, bear no 
relation to actual damages and are therefore illegal penalties.  
Some leases have ratcheting fees – for example, $5 a day for every 
day rent is late.  A tenant who pays her $800 rent twenty days late 
might owe $100 in late fees.  A landlord with a 10% mortgage 
would have incurred only $4 in interest lost.  The fee has no 
relation to the cost that the landlord actually bears from the late 
payment.  Other leases charge large late fees regardless of how 
much money is late.  A low-income tenant in subsidized housing 
whose portion of the rent is only $41 could face a $50 late fee when 
her rent is late.  This situation can snowball when a lease requires 
that payments apply first to late fees, then to rent.  So in the 
example of the subsidized tenant, if she pays her $41 rent on time 
the next month, but has no money for the late fee, she incurs a 
second $50 charge and now owes $100.  Such a situation can – and 
does – quickly lead to eviction and homelessness.  Creating limits 
similar to those in Chapter 325N would curb abuse. 
                                                          
 50. MINN. STAT. § 504B.171 (2004). 
 51. MINN. STAT. § 504B.211 (2004). 
 52. MINN. STAT. § 504B.215 (2004). 
 53. See Local 34, State, County & Mun. Employees v. County of Hennepin, 
310 Minn. 283, 288, 246 N.W.2d 41, 44 (1976); Palace Theatre, Inc. v. Nw. 
Theatres Circuit, Inc., 186 Minn. 548, 553, 243 N.W. 849, 851 (1932). 
 54. Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 481–82, 99 N.W.2d 69, 74–75 
(1959). 
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Providing a dollar limit for late fees and an objective definition 
of a reasonable charge would not be excessive regulation.  
Therefore, limiting late fees to a set amount or to the landlord’s 
actual damages, such as lost interest or administrative costs, would 
be a simple way to protect tenants against inflated fees that 
constitute a penalty without placing a heavy burden on landlords. 
B. Payday Loans: Disclose, and Limit, the APR. 
Minnesota state law regulates short-term, unsecured (often 
called “payday”) loans, but only loosely.  It caps APRs, but at an 
astronomical 390%.55  And while the law requires various 
disclosures, it does not require the lender to disclose the loan’s 
APR to the borrower.56  California is currently working to cap 
interest rates on such loans at 36%.57  A similar effort in Minnesota 
to cap APRs at a reasonable amount, combined with an APR 
disclosure requirement, would level the playing field without 
destroying the lender’s profit incentive.  Such requirements would 
help consumers understand the terms of their loans, dissuade 
borrowers who could do without the expensive loans, protect 
consumers with few options aside from the payday loans, and at 
36% – more than four times the usury rate in Minnesota – still 
provide a substantial profit to investors.  Setting limits would allow 
this market to continue to operate profitably, but with fewer 
incidents of abuse. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Minnesota’s Chapter 325N is an unusual consumer protection 
statute that provides substantive protections for homeowners 
entering into foreclosure reconveyance transactions.  This 
legislation protects parties on both sides of the transaction – it 
provides foreclosed homeowners with genuine protection against 
foreclosure rescue scams, allowing them a real chance at 
                                                          
 55. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60, subdivs. 1, 2 (2004) (outlining the various fee 
levels that are permitted for loans of up to $350).  For calculation of APR, see 
supra note 24.  See also Consumer Federation of America, Safe Harbor for Usury: 
Recent Developments in Payday Lending (Sept. 1999), available at http://www. 
consumerfed.org/pdfs/safeharbor.pdf; Wisconsin State Legislature, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Briefs (July 2000), available at http://www.legis.state. 
wi.us/lrb/pubs/wb/00wb7.pdf. 
 56. See MINN. STAT. § 47.60, subdiv. 4 (2004).  See also supra Part II. 
 57. Tony Perry, Targeting “Predator Lenders,” L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2006, at B6. 
15
Siegesmund and Weaver: Minnesota Statutes Chapter 325N: A Model for Substantive Consumer
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
5. SIEGESMUND & WEAVER - RC.DOC 12/15/2006  1:29:11 PM 
238 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
repurchasing their homes, all while giving foreclosure consultants 
and purchasers clear guidelines on how to structure the 
transactions.  The chapter sets limits that allow for a substantial 
profit while still ensuring that the transaction is commercially 
reasonable for the consumer.  If it can avoid federal preemption, 
this legislation could be a model for reforming other consumer 
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